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AGING POPULATIONS: MECHANICS, HISTORICAL
EMERGENCE, IMPACT
JOSEPH J. SPENGLER
In order to show by enumeration that the perimeter of a circle is less than that of any other
figure of the same area, we do not need a complete survey of all possible figures, but it
suffices to prove this for a few particular figures whence we can conclude the same thing,
by induction, for all the other figures. -R. Descartes, in Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii
This paper has to do with the mechanisms that bring about an increase in the
relative number of aged persons in a population. For reasons of expositive con-
venience the relative number of persons aged either 6o and over, or 65 and over,
will be conceived of as representing the relative number of "aged persons." The
first section of this paper will deal with the quantitative mechanics of the process
whereby the relative number of aged persons increases. The second section is de-
voted to the historical emergence of aging populations; and the third, to some of the
responses and circumstances which antedate, or are associated with, the emergence
of an aging population. The presentation is essentially theoretical in character,
though illuminated with empirical data.
MECHANICS
Of the population models at hand, that of the stable population is most suited
to explain the mechanics of population aging and the emergence of so-called older
populations. A stable population is one whose age distribution is constant; its rate
of increase may be positive, zero, or negative. Such a population will evolve if
the fertility of women at each age remains constant for a sufficiently long period
of time and if also age-specific mortality and the ratio of male to female births
remain unchanged meanwhile. Should these conditions persist for 5o-Ioo years,
a stable population, or at least a very close approximation to a stable population,
would come into being.' For the age composition of any population is the product
of its past natality and mortality, together with the number and age of the migrants
who have entered or left this population; and in the absence of such migration, it
is determined entirely by past natality and mortality.
Comparison of stable-population models enables one to distinguish the incidence
of mortality change upon age composition from that of fertility change, given that
external migration is without influence. It will be assumed initially, therefore,
1 on the genesis of a stable population, see AL..'aE J. LorA, T-R ioua ANALY IQUE DES AssocIA oNs
BIOLOGIQUES. DEux1imE PAnTiE: ANALYSE DmGOGR APmQUE AVEC APPLICATION PARTICULIRE A L',SPACE
HUMAINE 64-77 (1939); Coale, How the Age Distribution of a Modern Population is Determined, 2
CoLr SPRINo HAIBoR SYMPOSIA ON QUANTITATIVE BIOLOGY 83-89 (1957).
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that a population is dosed and that its age distribution is affected only by changes
in age-specific fertility or in age-specific mortality. Then, in keeping with the
method of comparative statics, the stable end products of assumed changes in
mortality and/or fertility may be contrasted. Later on, however, account will be
taken of relevant effects both of external migration and of transitional changes
associated with movement from one stable age-composition to another.
Tables one and two include data descriptive of stable populations found, respec-
tively, in high-mortality and in low-mortality countries.2 Since the so-called prob-
lem of aging tends to be more acute in countries with both low mortality and low
fertility than in countries with high mortality,3 we may turn first to table two
for illustrative purposes. The Gross Reproduction Rate (hereafter abbreviated
to G.R.R.) is there used to represent the force of fertility. Similarly, expecta-
tion of life at birth (hereafter designated E)5 is used to represent the force of
mortality. In table two, six Gross Reproduction Rates, ranging between 4 and i, have





P. A. B.R. D.R. N.I. P. A. B.I. D.R. N.T. P. A. B.R. D.R. NJ.
4.0 ....... 52.4 2.4 63.8 53.0 10.849.2 2.6 59.8 35.3 24.5 47.3 2.7 57.3 24.1 33.2
3.0 ....... 57.6 3.9 50.5 50.2 0.3 54.5 4.1 47.7 33.7 14.0 52.5 4.4 46.0 23.3 22.7
2.5 ....... 6 0.7 5.2 42.8 49.1 - 6.3 57.6 5.5 40.6 33.2 7.455.6 5.9 39.3 23.2 16.1
2.0 ....... 6 4.0 7.1 34.2 48.6 -14.4 60.9 7.7 32.7 33.6- 0.9 58.8 8.3 31.7 23.7 8.0
1.5 ....... 66.910.5 24.8 49.7 -24.9 63.8 11.5 23.8 35.0 -11.2 61.6 12.5 23.1 25.6- 2.5
1.0 ....... 68.316.9 14.6 54.4-39.865.018.7 14.0 39.9-25.9 62.620.4 13.6 30.9-17.3
Sounce: See note 2 infra.
ABBnsvAToNs: G.R.R.--Grss Reproduction Rate; E.-Expectation of Life atBirth; P.-Perentage of Stable Population aged 15-59;
A.-Percentage of Stable Population aged 60 and over; B.1.-Births per 1,000 inhabitants; D.R.-Deaths per 1,000 inhabitants; NJ.-
Exess of Births over Deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.
'For the source of the data in these tables, see U. N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WrLFARE,
Tim AGING OF PoPuLAxoNs AND rrs SocIAL AND ECoNoic IMPLICATIONS (Population Studies No. 26)
27, table 16 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. i956.XI.6).
'It is here supposed that when mortality is high, fertility also tends to be high; this is not a
necessary relationship but one that is highly probable on both social and (as indicated below) actuarial
grounds.
'The term "total fertility" is commonly used to describe the total number of children that would
be born to a cohort of i,ooo women arriving at the age of childbearing, if none died before passing
through this age. The Gross Reproduction Rate (G.R.R.) designates the total number of girls born
to such a cohort divided by 1,ooo. Thus, if a cohort of i,ooo women will produce, at current age-
specific fertility rates, 3,122 children, given that no member of the cohort dies before completing the
childbearing period, and if 1,517 of these children are girls, the Gross Reproduction Rate is 1.517.
See ROBET R. KuczyNSKi, THkE MEAsUREMENT OF POPULATION GROWTH 117-30 (1936).
The symbol i. is usually employed to represent the complete expectation of life at age x, or the
average number of years lived after age x per person surviving to exact age x. E designates , when
x designates age o. See L. I. DUBLIN, A. J. LoTxA & M. SPIEGOL~ .AN, LENGTH OF LIFE 20-22 (1949).




P. A. B.R. D.R. N.I. P. A. B.R. D.R. N.I. P. A. B.R. D.R. N.I,
4......45.8 2.7 55.7 16.2 39.544.4 2.7 54.1 9.4 44.743.3 2.6 52.7 4.1 48.3
3.0 ....... 50.9 4.5 44.9 15.8 29.149.6 4.4 43.8 9.6 34.24S.4 4.3 42.9 4.8 38.1
2.5 ....... 5 3.9 6.1 38.4 16.0 22.45 2.6 6.0 37.7 10.1 27.6 51.4 5.9 37.0 5.5 31.5
2.0 ....... 57.2 8.6 31.1 16.8 14.3 55.8 8.6 30.6 11.1 19.5 54.7 8.5 30.1 6.8 23.3
1.5 ....... 60.013.0 22.7 18.8 3.9 58.713.1 22.5 13.5 9.0 57.713.0 22.3 9.4 12.9
1.0 ....... 60.721.5 13.4 24.3 -10.9 59.421.9 13.3 19.0- 5.7158.621.9 13.3 15.1 - 1.8
Soinn = m ABeBmEnoNs: Same as in Table 1.
years, to yield eighteen stable age distributions. In table one the same six rates have
been combined with three low life expectancies to yield another eighteen stable age
distributions. We thus have thirty-six age distributions characteristic of thirty-six
stable populations and fairly descriptive of most of the stable populations that would
come into being in various parts of the world if current fertility and mortality sched-
ules were to remain constant for fifty or more years.
Comparison of the percentages reported in table two indicates that up to now
the proportion of persons aged 6o and over in a stable population has been affected
only negligibly by changes in the expectation of life at birth and almost entirely
by changes in fertility as measured by the G.R.R. One finds that if the G.R.R.
is held constant at 4.0, the percentage (reported in the columns headed A) formed
by persons aged 6o and over approximates 2.7, whatsoever the life expectancy,
while if the G.R.R. is held constant at 1.5, the percentage approximates 13.0,
whatsoever the life expectancy. In general, reading horizontally and to the right
along any line in tables one and/or two reveals only minor (if any) changes in the
relevant values of A as life expectancy E rises. I say relevant values because life
expectancy at birth has seldom fallen below the 30's in the past 15o years, and
most of the increase in A that accompanies increase in E is associated with progress
in E from 20 to 40. This means that decline in mortality has little effect upon
population aging, at least so long as life expectancy does not exceed 70. If, now,
one reads the columns headed A vertically, one finds that the value of A increases
steadily as the value of the G.R.R. descends from 4.0 to 1O; it is seven to eight times
as high when the G.R.R. is at the level of i.o as when the G.R.R. is at the level of 4.0.
This means that decline in fertility (i.e., in the G.R.R.) exercises a very great in-
fluence upon a population's age distribution. This influence is so great, when con-
trasted with that exercised by increase in life expectancy at birth, that one is war-
ranted in attributing the post-ir85o aging of populations almost exclusively to de-
cline in fertility.
MECHANICS,HI9TORICAL EMERGENCE IMPACT
What has been said respecting the impact of mortality declines and increase iii
life expectancy upon the relative number of persons aged 6o and over may be
subject to minor qualification. For the effect of mortality declines upon age com-
position depends upon the distribution of these declines among the members of a
population. Mortality declines will not alter a population's age composition if sur-
vival rates at all ages increase in the same proportion. If, however, mortality de-
clines are confined to members of a population aged (say) 50 and over, they have
no effect upon the number of births and the long-time growth rate, serving only
to increase the absolute and the relative number of persons who survive to older
ages. If, on the contrary, mortality declines are confined to children (say) under
5, they will affect age distribution much as does an increase in fertility; they will
presently (i.e, about 13-17 years hence) begin to increase the number of parents and
the flow of births as well as the rate of population growth. In the past century
mortality declines have usually decreased the median age of the population some-
what and have decreased the proportion of the population aged 65 and over in
about half of the forty-four cases studied. For the age-reducing effect of mortality de-
clines among those aged under 5 has more than offset the age-increasing effect
of mortality declines among those over 5o, while the probability of survival has
increased much less and in similar proportions among those aged 5-5o. Whence
Coale concludes "that most mortality improvements in the past have produced a
younger population than would have resulted from unchanged mortality, other
factors the same."6
While improvements in mortality may continue to produce younger popula-
tions in countries in which mortality still remains high, they will tend to produce
older populations in countries in which mortality risks have by now fallen to low
levels. For with a life expectancy at birth in the 70's, ninety-six to ninety-eight per
cent or more of all live-born females survive to childbearing age (i.e., to 15) and
ninety-three to ninety-seven per cent reach an age (i.e., 40) beyond which very few
children are borne; there is little scope, consequently, for mortality reduction to in-
crease the fraction surviving to and through the childbearing period.7 The
mortality declines in prospect, therefore, will probably prolong the life of those
0 See Coale, supra note I, at 83-89; Coale, The Effects of Changes in Mortality and Fertility on A4ge
Composition, 34 MILBANK MEmORIAL FUND QuARTRu.Y 79-114 (1956); Stolnitz, Mortality Declines and
Age Distribution, 34 id. 178-215; Coale, The Effects of Declines in Mortality on Age Distribution, in
F. G. BOUDREAU & C. V. KISER (EDs.), TRENDS AND DIFFERENTIALS IN MORTALITY (Proceedings of the
1955 Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund) 125-33 (1956). See also Sauvy, Le Viel-
lissement des Populations at Allongeament de la Vie, 9 POPULATiON 675-82 (1954); Lorimer, Dynamics
of Age Structure in a Population with Initially High Fertility and Mortality, I U.N. POPULATION BUL-
LETIN 3-41 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. x9 52.XIII.2); The Causes of Aging of Populations, 4 id. 30-38(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1955.XIII.I).
7Ninety-tvo to ninety-six per cent of all live-born females attain the age of 45. The above
percentages are based upon the model life tables prepared by the United Nations. See U.N. DEP'T oF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE, METHODS FOR POPULATION PROJECTIONS BY SEX AND AGE (Population
Studies No. 25) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1956.XIII.3); AGE AND SEX PATTERNS Os MORTALITY (Population
Studies No. 22) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 195 5.XIH.9). See also Gabriel & Ronen, Estimates of Mortality
and Mortality Rates, 12 POPULATION STUDIES 164-69 (1958).
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who reach 50 more than enough to offset the effects of any further decline in
mortality among those under 5. Such at least will be the probable effect of further
declines in mortality in Western countries with life expectancies in the neighbor-
hood of 70.S
It is when mortality declines appreciably below levels corresponding to a life
expectancy of 70 that such decline accelerates population aging. If we replace a
population with a G.R.R. of 4.0 and an E of 2o by one with a G.R.R. of x.o and
an E of 7o, the decline in mortality increases the proportion aged 6D and over only
from 24 to 2.6 per cent of the population. If now we hold the G.R.R. at x.o and in-
crease life expectancy (ie., E) further to 9o, the proportion aged 6o and over rises
from twenty-two per cent to around thirty-three per cent. Even if the G.R.R. is
around the 1.5 level, increase in E from 70 to 90 produces a correspondingly high
increase in the relative number of persons aged 6o and over, from around thir-
teen to close to twenty per cent of the populationO With E at 70 it is not possible
to increase the rate of population growth much by decreasing mortality; in fact,
if death were abolished altogether the growth rate would rise by less than 2 per
i,ooo. The proportion aged 6o and over would increase markedly, however, if
immortality replaced a life expectancy of 70 at birth; with the G.R.R. at x.5 or lower
it would approach 414 per cent or exceed this figure, though with a G.R.R. as high
as 3.0 it would not rise above 9.i per cent. It is much more likely, of course, that the
G.R.R. will lie between i.o and 1.5 than that it will approximate 3.0.10
Fertility-reducing forces make for population aging because they reduce the
rate of population growth and the rate at which births flow into the lower age
groups. In consequence younger cohorts no longer exceed older cohorts so mark-
edly, if at all, in size, with the result that the median age of the population rises,
the age distribution itself becomes less favorable to fertility, and the relative number
of persons aged 6o and over increases. A rise in fertility produces an opposite set
of effects.
The trends illustrated by the data presented in tables one and two hold generally
even when a population is in transit from a stable form characterized by relatively
high fertility and/or mortality to one characterized by relatively low rates. They
are manifest also in the unfolding of populations that have been projected into the
future on the basis of an initial set of suppositions respecting fertility and mortality.
While a certain amount pf oscillation may mark the upward or the downward
movement of the relative number aged 6o and over when the G.R.R. or life
expectancy are changed and one stable population is gradually transformed into
another, it is the upward or downward movement that is paramount."
' Stolnitz, supra note 6, tables i, 3, 8 and io.
9 THE AGING OF POPULAMTONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECoNOMIO IMPLCATIONS, Op. cit. supra note 2,
at 28-3o.1 0See Coale, Increases in Expectation of Life and Population Growth, in PROMEDINGS OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL POPULATION CONFERENCE (held in Vienna under the auspices of the International Union
for the Scientific Study of Population, 1959) 36-41 (9.59).
'THE AGING OF POPULATIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, op. cit. Stipra note 2,
at 3043.
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Transitory effects on age distribution are in the same general direction as the eventual
effects on the stable age distribution. A rise in fertility produces an increase in the
proportion in the younger age group at the expense of the older; a proportionate increase
at all ages in the probability of surviving affects only the growth rate; an extra increase
in survivorship at the youngest ages has an effect much like a rise in fertility; an increase
in survivorship at the older ages tends to raise the fraction at these ages.' 2
While age compositions tend to be more irregular and notchy and knobby in
the world of reality than in that of hypothetical stable populations, inferences drawn
from comparisons of the latter continue to hold. In the world of reality both mor-
tality and fertility may vary appreciably from year to year, sometimes rising above
and sometimes falling below trend levels and then moving back to these levels.
This is true of mortality in that while every person born must die, he may die at any
time within the interval separating his birth and the end of his life span (say io
-- IO years), "s with the result that catastrophic events (e.g., war, epidemic disease)
may greatly increase mortality for short periods. 4 Natality may vary even more
than mortality, for a fecund woman may not only choose to bear a given number
of children earlier or later within her effective childbearing period (say between the
ages of 15 and 40), but may also determine to make this number larger or smaller
within certain limits (say o to io). The birth rate and the annual number of
births may vary appreciably, therefore, between times of war and times of
peace, between times of prosperity and times of depression, and so on' 5 As a re-
sult of such variations in the annual number of births, or birth cohorts, humps and
hollows are introduced into a population's age distribution and not only move
through it as these abnormally sized cohorts age but also produce positive or negative
echo effects when the children of these oversized or undersized cohorts attain
childbearing age.' In consequence, the rate at which the labor force increases
may vary. These transitory waves of high or low fertility may be of some signif-
icance, therefore, in respect of the maintenance of full employment; but they exer-
cise little influence upon the course of a population's aging.17
"Coale, The Effects of Changes in Mortality and Fertility on Age Composition, 34 MILBANK ME-
MORIAL FUND QuATER.Y 79, 113 (1956).
' See Freeman, The Geriatric Limb on the Gerontology Tree, in AMERICAN ASs'N FOR THE ADVANcE-
MENT OF SCIENCE, AGING: SOME SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS 20 (N. W. Shock ed. 196o).
'See, e.g., HENRI BUNLE, LE MOUVEMENT NATUREX DR LA POPULAION DANS LE MONDE DE i9o6 I
1936, at 322-89 (1954). Annual mortality among German males was about 70% higher in the period
1915-18, than in 1913, largely because of the toll of war. Mortality among German females was about
30% higher in x918 than in 1914 or 1915, largely because of the influenza epidemic of 1918. Id.
at 333.
' See, e.g., id. at 289-305; RoBERT R. Kucamzsi, ThE BALANCE OF BItmhs AND DEATHS 94-97
(1928); U.N. DEP'T OF EcoNotIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE, RECENT TRENDS IN FERTILITY IN INDUS-
TRiALIzED CoUNTrIEs (Population Studies No. 27) ch. 2 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957.XIII.2). See also,
Kiser, Changes in Fertility by Socio-Economic Status During 1940-50, 33 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
QUARTERLY 393-429 (1955); Ryder, Problems of Trend Determination During a Transition in Fertility,
34 id. 5-21 (1956); Stolnitz, Population Composition and Fertility Trends, 21 AM. Socio. Rv.
738-43 (1956).
"' Coale, How the Age Distribution of a Modern Population is Determined, 22 COLD SPRING HARBOR
SYMinOSIA ON QuAN TTATrVE BIOLOGY 83, 87-89 (1957).
1 Variation in the rate of increase in the labor force arising from variation in annual fertility could
give rise to a kind of cobweb effect if the rate of unemployment were positively correlated with the rate
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It, is very difficult to describe in simple terms the impact of net migration upon
a population's age distribution, particularly since migration fluctuates so much in
volume and varies greatly in time. One may, of course, say that the ratio of net
migration to a country's population is seldom large enough to affect its age dis-
tribution significantly and that even this effect tends in time to be swamped by the
cumulative influence of domestic natality and mortality. Net immigration will de-
celerate a population's aging if it increases the younger age groups by a larger
fraction than it swells the older age groups, and particularly if the young immi-
grants are able to increase the flow of births notably. If, on the contrary, net
immigration contributes primarily to the increase of those in and above the upper
30's, it will presently accelerate the aging process since the immigrants them-
selves will move into the older age groups before they have increased the flow of
births significantly. The influx of migrants into the United States as well as into
many European, Latin American, and Asian countries is now too small to affect
the aging process notably. Studies relating to the present century reveal migration
to have had little effect upon population aging.'8
In this section we have established four conclusions. (i) The aging of popula-
tions as evidenced in increase in the relative number aged 6o-65 and over has been
produced almost entirely by the decline in fertility and natural increase. (2) In-
crease in the average duration of life and even prolongation of life among those
over 50 has exercised little influence upon the course of aging, sometimes accelerat-
ing it and sometimes decelerating it. (3) While net migration influenced age
composition significantly in countries (e.g., the United States) which for a time
experienced heavy migration, this influence diminished with the decline of im-
migration in relative importance; it has since been swamped by the cumulative
impact of fertility and mortality. (4) Should life expectancy at birth rise into
and above the upper 70's, its extension would begin to affect the course of popula-
tion aging significantly if the G.R.R. remained relatively low (say between i.o
and 1.5).
of increase in the labor force. Suppose fertility is low at time t1=o because unemployment is relatively
high. Then at (say) time =2o the rate of increase in the labor force will be relatively low as conse-
quently will be unemployment. Whence fertility rises above normal in year 1=2o only to make for
supra-normal unemployment in year (say) =4o. In reality, of course, the unemployment-affecting in-
fluence of variations in fertility is likely to be swamped by other forces connected little or not at all
with the behavior of annual fertility rates.
" For a model tracing the impact of continuous net migration upon the age distribution of the
populations of Argentina and Venezuela, see U.N. Dzp'" OF SoCIL. AND ECONOMIc ,VELPArx, Thn
POPULATION OF Soutm AMRmuCA x95o-198o (Population Studies No. 21) 1o9-39 (U.N. Pub. Sales No.
x9 5 5 .XIII.4 ). The age structure is not much affected. Id. at 118-23. For an estimate of the possible
impact of immigration on Fxance's population at the close of the war, see Sauvy, Besoins et possibilill$ de
P'immigration Franfaise, 5 PoPUILAnrsO 209-28, 417-34 (9o50). See also, THE AGING OF PoPULAnONs
AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECoNoMIe IMPLICAnTONS, op. di. supra note 2, at 22, 47-49; Some Quantitative A-
pects of the Aging of Populations, i U. N. POPULATION BULLETIN 42-57 (U.N. Pub. Sales No.: 1952.
XIII.2). In nineteenth century America, of course, immigration affected age composition notably.
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II
HiSTORICAL EMERGENCE
Population aging set in only in the nineteenth century, and then only in a few
countries. Prior to that century life expectancy at birth was in or below the 30's,
and by the close of that century it had risen, in progressive countries, only into the
upper 40's or the low 50's, with the main declines in mortality not getting effec-
tively under way until the closing decades of the nineteenth century or the early
decades of the twentieth century.' 9 In consequence, as was noted earlier, the
decline in mortality long tended to retard rather than to accelerate population aging;
in any event, it did not intensify the process. Not until recently did this process
begin to be reversed, and even now there remain many countries in which further
reduction of mortality would not accelerate the population-aging process.20 As
has been remarked earlier, therefore, the historical emergence of population aging
has been associated almost entirely with the decline in fertility, and this decline did
not, as a rule, get under way until in the second half of the nineteenth century.
While gross reproduction rates considerably in excess of three have been recorded
(e.g., 3.65 in the Ukraine in 1896-97; 3.4 in northern Japan in the i92o's; close to
4.0 in the United States around i8oo) for large population aggregates, rates in the
neighborhood of 2.5-3.0 seem to have predominated in and before the eighteenth
century.2 ' Moreover, although natality began to fall in France and the United
States in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, to be followed later by a
decline in natural increase, declines in natality and subsequently in natural increase
did not really get under way in Europe until the dosing third of the nineteenth
century and even then they were confined largely to Western Europe.2 ' In the
present century, however, the decline in natality spread to all the countries in
Europe. There, as well as in Northern America and in Oceania, natality fell with
increasing rapidity and so did crude and true natural increase. Elsewhere, with
the increasing exception of Japan and with the partial exception of portions of
temperate Latin America, natality generally remained more or less at nineteenth-
century levels. It remained so even though, with progress in the development of
effective public-health and disease-control programs and the consequent reduction
" See DUBLIN, LOTKA & SPIEGELMAN, op. Cit. supra note 5, chs. 2, 3, tables 8i-gi; Stolnitz, A Century
of International Mortality Trends, Pt. 1, 9 POPULATION STUDIES 24-55 (1955); Pt. 2, 10 id. 17 (1956);
U. N. DEP'T oF EcONOMsIC AND SoCIAL AFFAIRS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 4-5 (U. N. Pub. Sales No.
19 57.XIII.I).
'Id. at 1-5.
"Russell, Late Ancient and Medieval Population, 48 TRANSACnONS OF THE AMERICAN PHLOSOPHICAL
SocaTY (n.s.) Pt. 2 (1958); ROGER MoLS, S.J., INTRODUCTION X LA D MOGRAPHIE HISTORIQUE DES
VILLES D'EUROPE DU xiV e AU XVIIIe SIrCLE (1954); Durand, The Population Statistics of China
A.D. 2-z953, 13 POPULATION STUDIES 2o9-56 (ig6o); Durand, Mortality Estimates from Roman Tomb-
stone Inscriptions, 65 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 365-73 (596o).
'See ROBERT R. KuczNsvi, op. cit. supra note 15, chs. 1-3; BUNLE, op. cit. supra note 14, table I;
E. S. WOYTINSKY, WORLD POPULATION AND PRODUCTION ch. 5 (953); M. HUBER, H. BUNLE & F.
BovERAT, LA POPULATION DE LA FRANCE 78-85 (1931); V. S. THoMPsoN & P. K. WHELPTON, POPULATION
TRENDS IN TimE UNITED STATES chs. 7-8 (1933).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of the positive correlation of life expectancy with income, mortality fell sharply
in most countries, among them many with underdeveloped economies and very
low incomes. In and after the x94o's there was an upsurge of natality, especially in
low-natality countries, but it has since fallen, though only in a few instances to or
below the usually low levels of the I93o's.P
While population aging emerged in the late nineteenth century, it proceeded
very slowly. Around i85o in European countries the proportion of the popula-
tion aged 65 and over was around or below five per cent; only in slowly growing
France did it approach 6!/z per cent. By i9oo this proportion ranged between five
and 84 per cent in European countries in which natality had fallen, and generally
around or below four elsewhere in the world. By x95o, however, this proportion had
moved upwards and into a range of seven to twelve per cent in Europe, Northern
America, and Oceania. It was still around five per cent in Japan though rising; but
elsewhere in the world it remained around or below four as a rule.24 The world
may thus be described as divisible roughly into two sectors, one in which fertility
remains high and the relative number of older persons is quite low, and the other in
which fertility is relatively low and the relative number of older persons is large and
rising. In i95o in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, for example, only four to six per
cent of the population were 6o and over. In Europe, Northern America, and
Oceania the corresponding fraction was eleven to twelve per cent, and in the U.S.S.R.
it was eight per cent and rising. 5
The world picture still remains much as it was in x95o, manifesting little
tendency toward homogeneity in respect of population aging. Moreover, sub-
stantial change therein is not likely for some decades, given current fertility trends.
For the tendency on the part of fertility to fall remains weak in Asia (exclusive
of Japan), in most of Africa, and in much of Latin America; and gross reproduc-
tion in the rest of the world seems unlikely to rise appreciably. It has been esti-
mated, therefore, that as of 1975 only five to six per cent of the population of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America will be 6o and over. In Europe, Northern America, and
Oceania, by contrast, the corresponding percentages will be seventeen, sixteen, and
'See, e.g., U.N. DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1959, at 1-17,
table 9 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 59.XIII.I). It should perhaps be noted that the severing of the connection
between improvement in economic conditions and the reduction of morbidity and mortality is by no
means complete, being attributable in marked degree to the export of death- and disease-control from
high income to low income countries. It remains to be seen how completely this severing can be
sustained in the face of high natality, low income, and persisting poverty. Even in advanced countries,
mortality and morbidity are somewhat associated with the environmental conditions surrounding indi-
viduals, among them income levels (which, within limits, are inversely related to mortality). For in-
formation on this last point, see Recent and Future Mortality Trends, Statistical Bulletin of the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, June, 196o, pp. 1-3 [hereinafter cited as Statistical Bulletin).
"'THE AGING OF POPULATIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, Op. cit. supra note 2, at
12; Valaoras, A Reconstruction of the Demographic History of Modern Greece, 38 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND QUARTERLY 116-39 (i960).
'U. N. DP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE, THE FuTURE GROWTH OF WORLD POPULATION
(Population Studies No. 28) table 15 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58.XIIL2). In z959, about 9.4% of the
population of the U.S.S.R. was 6o or over. Computed from U. N. DE'T oF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
WELFARE, D MoGR.APIC YEARoox 1959, at 165 (U. N. Pub. Sales No.: 59.XIII.I).
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fourteen, respectively. It will approximate eleven in the U.SS.R. and 11.6 in
Japan 6 Turning to the United States we find the proportion aged 65 and over,
which rose from 34 in 188o to 5.6 in i5o, will advance to between nine and ten per
cent by 198o if the G.R.R. remains within the range 1.8-2.o. It could approximate
lO.5 if, as seems unlikely, the G.R.R. moved into the neighborhood of 1.3 . Should
life expectancy increase more than these projections presuppose, the fraction would
then be slightly higher at given fertility levels3 7 If our population continues to grow
1.5-1.6 per cent per year and hence numbers around 350 millions by the year 2000,
the 35 million persons 65 and over in prospect forty years from now will form about
ten per cent of the population.
One can write somewhat (though not much) more firmly about prospective
mortality than about prospective fertility, since fertility tends to be more volatile
than mortality. What happens in respect of life expectancy at birth can become
significant if it rises from below or in the neighborhood of 70 to in the neighbor-
hood of 9o; for, as has been noted, such movement would greatly increase popula-
tion aging should gross reproduction remain at levels now usually encountered in
low-mortality, high-income countries. Realization of such an upward movement,
however, presupposes the establishment of control over a different set of causes
of death than have been curbed in the past. For more than a century, particularly
during the past 50-6o years, mortality has been reduced in considerable measure
through the successive establishment of control over important epidemic and louse-
borne diseases, over gastro-intestinal -diseases, over tuberculosis, pneumonia-in-
fluenza, and other respiratory diseases, over the communicable diseases of child-
hood, and over mortality flowing from the cumulative impact of conditions as-
sociated with hard, poverty-ridden environments 8 Today, largely as a result of
this mortality reduction, cardiovascular-renal diseases and malignant neoplasms
(the incidence of both of which increases with age), together with degenerative
diseases, account for considerably more than half of the deaths occurring in ad-
vanced countries.P The future course of life expectancy, therefore, depends largely
-'THE FUTURE GROWTH OF WVORLD POPULATION, op. cit. su ra note 25, table 16; U.N. DEP'T OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VELFARE, TIM POPULATION or ASIA AND THE FAR EAST 1950-1980 (Population
Studies No. 31) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 59.XIII.3); TIE POPULATION OP Sourr-EAsr AsIA (Population
Studies No. 30) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1959.XlII.3).
'These percentages are derived from U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEr'T op COMMERCE, ILLus-
TRATIVE PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES By AGE AN" SEX (Ser. P-25, Current
Population Rep. No. 187, x958).
' See 0. W. ANDERSON & GEORGE ROSEN, AN EXAMNATION OF THE CONCEPT OF PREVENTIVE MED-
ICINE, HEALTH INFORmATION RESEARCH SER. No. 12 (Ig6o); 0. V. ANDERSON & MONROE LERNER,
MEASURING HEALTH LEWIs IN THE UNITED STATES, HEALTH IN.FOsU.TION RESEARCH SEr. No. ii (196o).
Between 1911 and 196o, death rates from selected causes per Ioo,ooo policyholders of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company declined from 1,253 to 671.2. Of this 582 point drop, 488 points are the re-
sult of decline in mortality from four sets of disease (tuberculosis, communicable diseases of childhood,
nephritis and nephrosis, and pneumonia and influenza) which by i96o accounted for about 5%
of the deaths instead of the 42% as in igi. Another 62 points were accounted for by declines in
mortality from appendicitis, gastrids, etc., hernia and intestinal obstruction, and complications of pregnancy
and childbirth. See Fifty Years of Health Progress, Statistical Bulletin, Jan. 1961, P.4.
'Of each 671 deaths among the industrial policyholders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany, mortality among whom now resembles that in the nation at large, 142 were attributed to
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upon what can be done in respect of the control of these diseases.
Undoubtedly man's ability to establish control over these now very important
diseases will- fall far short of his ability to curb the diseases he has brought under
control in the past IOO-i5o years. It is true, of course, that elimination of all neo-
plasms as a cause of death would increase life expectancy at birth 2.0 and 2.6 years,
respectively, for white males and white females; the corresponding gains at age
6o would be 1.3 and 1.5 years. It is also true that elimination of cardiovascular-
renal diseases as a cause of death would increase life expectancy at birth xo.7 years
for white males and 1o.3 years for white females; the corresponding gains at age 6o
would be 9.9 and io years, respectively!' Were it possible to reduce only by half
the mortality attributable to cardiovascular-renal diseases and malignant neoplasms,
life expectancy at age 66 (15.7 years for white males and 19.2 for white females in
1958) would rise about five years for each sex.!' At present, however, it can only
be said that progress in the extension of life expectancy at birth has slowed down
notably and that, unless cardiovascular-renal diseases and neoplasms can be brought
under control more rapidly than in the past, progress in the extension of life ex-
pectancy at advanced ages will slow down as well. It is quite possible, moreover,
that increase in disease-generating forces (e.g., chemical, atomic, and other pollu-
tion of the environment; increasing exposure to urban hazards and stress; exces-
sive avoidance of danger, discomfort, and tension; overconsumption of food, etc.)
will worsen man's relevant environment and partly offset progress in methods
suited to control degenerative and other diseases of old ageO2 It is to be doubted,
therefore, that man's life span will be increased, or that his life expectancy at birth
will be raised above 8o, and accomplishing this should take 5o-Ioo or more years.
From what has been said in this section we may now draw certain inferences.
It is doubtful if, with life expectancy around 70, the G.R.R. will remain as high
as 1.5, since this would entail a rate of population growth of about 1.3 per cent
per year (see last column in table two). We may suppose, therefore, that in highly
malignant neoplasms, 357 to cardiovascular-renal diseases, and 32 to accidents. Id. at 4. Of each ioo
deaths reported in the United States in 1959, 68.1% were attributed to diseases of the heart, malignant
neoplasms, vascular lesions affecting the central nervous system, and general arteriosclerosis. Trends in
U. S. Mortality, so PRoGEEss IN HEALTH SEvicEs I ff. (Feb. g6i). These proportions indicate the orders
of magnitude characteristic of economically advanced, low-mortality countries, even though inter-
country differences obtained.
= Increased Life Expectancy in the United States, 9 PROoRESS IN HEALTH SEivicrs I if. (Dec. 196o).
These figures, based on American Life Expectancy in the period 1949-5I, are treated more fully in
Woodhall & Jablon, Prospects for Further Increases in Longevity, 12 GERIATRICS 586-91 (1957).
"Outlook for Gains in Longevity after Age 6o, Statistical Bulletin, Nov. 196o, pp. 1-3; Trends
in Survival at the Older Ages, id., Sept. i96o, pp. 1-3. Given a life expectancy of about 70 years
at birth, about 81-84% of those born reach the age of 6o.
22Up to now, of course, these forces have not been effective on balance. As was noted earlier, for
example, mortality is lower among those engaged in better paying than in worse paying positions. See
Recent and Future Mortality Trends, Statistical Bulletin, June 596o, pp. 1-3. Life expectancy at
birth among this company's industrial policyholders increased about five years per decade between x9g1-
12 and 195o, but only 2.3 years in 1950-6o, and o.6 years in 1955-6o. Fifty Years of Health Progress,
id., Jan. i961, pp. 1-7. Expectation of life increased 5-6 tenths of a year per decade among white males
in the sixties in 1929-54; among white females, the rate was slightly more than twice as high as among
the white males. Trends in Survival at the Older Ages, id., Sept. 196o, pp. x-3.
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developed, low-mortality countries the G.R.R. will tend to move below rather than
above 1.5. This entails that the relative number of persons aged 6o and over will
exceed thirteen per cent and may approach close to twenty per cent. If under these
fertility conditions life expectancy at birth were to advance toward 8o years, the frac-
tion aged 6o and over would move above the thirteen to twenty per cent levels. In
fact, with life expectancy at 8o and given prospective fertility, this fraction would
probably move into the neighborhood of twenty. 5 It is to be expected that gross
reproduction in high-fertility countries (wherein live about two-thirds of the world's
population) will fall. Should natality fall o.5-i.o point per year from current levels
of around 40-45,"4 natality in most high-fertility countries might be in or below the
neighborhood of 2o by the year 2000. As a result the fraction 6o and over will have
moved or be moving into the neighborhood of thirteen per cent. As yet, however,
there has been little manifestation of the imminence of so high a rate of decline.
III
IMPACT
Our concern in this section is with the implications of the set of changes in the
age composition of populations of which population aging is only one. It is mis-
leading to study the impact of population aging as such. For population aging
is inseparably connected with other changes in age composition. All of these must
be taken into account if the true impact of population aging upon production,
income, and dependency is to be ascertained.
It has been shown (see tables one and two) that, with fertility constant, in-
crease in the expectation of life at birth up to the age of 70 usually modifies the
fraction of the population 6o and over very little, and then only when life expec-
tancy is in or below the 40's. It has also been shown that population aging is
attributable almost entirely to decrease in the G.R.R. (see A-columns in tables one-
two). Attention may now be called to the fact that a decline in the G.R.R. even-
tuates in a decline in the relative number of persons under 15 and hence in an
associated increase in the relative number aged 15-59 (see P-columns in tables
one-two). For example, with a life expectancy of 6o at birth, the percentage of a stable
population aged 15-59 rises from 444 when the G.R.R. is 4.0 through 52.6 when it
is at 2.5 to about fifty-nine when it lies between 1.5 and i.o. This increase in the rela-
tive number aged 15-59 is entirely the product of decline in the G.R.R., since increase
in life expectancy serves, ceteris paribus, to reduce the relative number aged 15-59
and increase both that aged 0-14 and (within narrow limits) that aged 6o and
over. It should be noted, however, that when life expectancy at birth has reached
a level around 5o-that is, a level of the sort found in the developed world around
I THE AGING OF POPULATIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, OP. cit. supra note 2,
at 28-29.
"In Central Europe during the period (x8oo's to 1920's) of most rapid decline, natality fell roughly
between 0.5 and 0.75 points per year; in Japan and Puerto Rico, about one point per year during the
recent period of rapid decline.
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i9oo and in, much of the underdeveloped world today-further augmentation of
the average duration of life does not greatly reduce the relative number aged 15-
59 until it has moved into or beyond the upper 70's. For, with the G.R.R. given,
at any level between 4.0 and i.o, increasing life expectancy from 50 to 70. years
reduces the fraction aged 15-59 only three to four per cent (see tables one-two).
Decline in gross reproduction, the cause of population aging, is thus responsible
for both the increase that has taken place in the relative number of adults of pro-
ductive age (say 15-59) and the decrease in the relative number of persons of de-
pendent age (say those aged 0-14 plus those aged 6o and over). For illustrative
purposes let us begin with a stable population with a G.R.R. of 3 and a life ex-
pectancy of 30, that is, with a population of the sort found in pre-18oo Europe or
in parts of present-day Tropical Africa. If now the G.R.R. declines from 3.0 to
1.O while life expectancy remains unchanged at 30 (or, for that matter, at 40, 50,
6o, or 70), the percentage aged 15-59 rises from 54.5 to sixty-five, that is, by Io.5 points
or nineteen per cent (see tables one-two). If next life expectancy rises to 70, these io.5
points are reduced to 4.1, since with a G.R.R. of i.o and a life expectancy of 70., only
58.6 instead of sixty-five per cent of a stable population are aged 15-59 years. In gen-
eral, as life expectancy rises, the percentages aged 0-14 and 6o and over rise, though
with most of the rise associated with increase in life expectancy between 20 or 30 and
50 years rather than with that between 50 and 70. Decline in fertility thus per-
mits populations to absorb increases in life expectancy without suffering net
changes in age-composition that are unfavorable to potential productivity.
Should life expectancy increase into and beyond the upper 70's, however, it
would finally become impossible, in low-fertility countries, to offset this increase
by further reducing fertility. For, given a G.R.R. below 1.5, increase in life ex-
pectancy into and beyond the upper 70's would reduce the fraction of a stable popu-
lation in the age group 15-59 below the fifty-eight per cent level associated with a life
expectancy of 7o and a G.R.R. of between i.o and 1.5. This fraction would decline
to around the fifty-two per cent level if life expectancy at birth rose to 9o while the
G.R.R. remained at 1.5. It is unlikely, however, for reasons advanced in section
two, that life expectancy will rise above 8o. If this argument proves empirically valid,
therefore, the fraction aged 15-59 will decline no more than several points below
the fifty-eight per cent level, even though the G.R.R. is somewhat below i.5 '
Given the changes in fertility and mortality in prospect, changes in the age
composition of populations will not reduce potential productivity per capita and in
many instances will increase it as in the past. The movement of the fraction of
the population aged 15-59 (or 15-64) may be used to indicate the movement of po-
tential productivity per capita as a population's age composition changes ceteris
patibus (i.e., with capital per worker, state of the arts, level of employment, etc.
given). It will be indicated below that the movement of this index (i.e., the frac-
", This argument is based on data to be found in THE AGING OF POPULA77ONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND
EcoNoMIc IMPLICAIONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 28-30.
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tion aged x5-59) is sufficient for the purposes of the present inquiry. Changes
in the percentages aged 15-59 and presented in tables one-two suggest that potential
per capita productivity has changed very little (perhaps one to three per cent) in the
past i6o years. For in a stable population of the sort associated with West European
mortality and fertility as of around i8oo (i.e, with a life expectancy of 3o and a
G.R.R. of 2.5) 57.6 per cent are aged i5-59; while in one associated with a life ex-
pectancy (i.e., around 50) and a G.R.R. (i.e., around 2.0) of the sort prevailing in
economically developed countries around itoo, about fifty-seven per cent are aged 15-
59. Even in a stable population of the sort compatible with fertility (i.e., a G.R.R. of
i.o-i.5) and mortality (i.e., a life expectancy of 70) in present-day advanced coun-
tries, only fifty-eight per cent are in the age group 15-59.
Intertemporal and intercountry comparisons indicate, however, that actual changes
in age composition have been greater than is suggested by these comparisons of the
stable populations. In a number of representative Western European countries, for
example, sixty to sixty-two per cent of the population fell in the age -group 15-64
around i85o and again around i9oo. By i95o, however, the percentage had risen to
sixty-five to sixty-seven, both in these countries and in a number of countries in
which as of i89o-i9oo the corresponding percentage was fifty-eight to fifty-ninef 6
It may be inferred, therefore, that because of improvements in age composition
potential per capita productivity in these countries increased about eight per cent
between the second half of the nineteenth century and i95o. Around 195o in
many high-fertility, underdeveloped countries the percentage of the population aged
15-64 fell in the range fifty-three to fifty-six; this percentage, when compared with
that of sixty-five to sixty-seven found in many low-fertility, developed' countries, in-
dicates that, because of differences in age composition, potential per capita produc-
tivity ceteris paribus was about one-sixth lower in the underdeveloped than in the
developed countries. Moreover, because the relative number of children of school
age was so much higher in these high-fertility countries, about twice as large a frac-
tion of the labor force was required in these countries as in low-fertility countries
to supply a given level of educational servicesY7
Potential productivity per capita varies with a population's age composition for
three main reasons, two of which are essentially socio-economic in character and
only one of which is closely associated With the influence that age as such exercises
upon a worker's psycho-physical capacities, work-experience, etc. These three
age-conditioned determinants are variation in rate of participation in the labor
force, variation in the fullness with which members of the labor force are employed,
and variation in output per man-hour worked. Each determinant tends to vary
with the age of workers, the first two largely because of the manner in which an
'In France, the first country to experience great changes in age composition, the percentage of the
population in the age group x5-64 was 66.23 in 1850, 65.88 in x910, and 66-53 in x95o.
' This and the preceding paragraph are based on data presented in TnE AmING oF POPULAnONs
AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICAIONS, .Op. cit. supra note 2, at 7-X5. For. data relating to Japan,
see IRENE TAE.aua, YTsr PopuLrATIoN OF JAPAN. (i958).
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economy is organized and the last principally because of the effects which aging
has upon a worker's capacities. The response of each of these determinants to
changes in age is conditioned also by a population's educational and occupational
composition. It is to be presumed, however, that when all these various deter-
minants and conditions are taken into account, actual as well as potential produc-
tivity per capita will still be found to vary much as does the fraction of the popu-
lation of productive age (say, 15-59 or 15-64).
While variation in age affects the rate of participation in the labor force among
both males and females, male activity rates may be employed to illustrate the role
of age which is very much affected by socio-economic conditions and organization.
Male activity rates tend to be higher at most ages, and especially at low and high
ages, in countries that are underdeveloped and predominantly agricultural than
in those which are not. Even so, because of differences in age composition, the
fraction which male workers form of all males is slightly higher (around five per
cent) in developed than in underdeveloped countries or than in semi-developed
countries where activity rates tend to be lower among young and old males than
in underdeveloped countries. If we assume stable-population conditions and male
activity rates of the sort characteristic of developed, semi-developed, and under-
developed countries, we find that, whereas increasing life expectancy from 5o to
70 years reduces by only three to five per cent the percentage which active males form
of all males io years or more old, decreasing the G.R.R. from 3.0 to i.o will increase
this percentage about two-fifths. We find also that whereas increase in the expecta-
tion of life at birth from 50 to 7o years has little effect upon the age composition
of the active male population io years or more old, decrease in the G.R.R. reduces
the relative number of active males aged io-I9 and 20-44 years and increases that
aged 45-64 and that 65 and overf8  How labor-force participation rates respond
to changes in age composition is affected, as has been noted, by a population's
educational composition, education serving to increase and to prolong participation
in the labor force and in occupational activities which can be carried on effectively
at higher ages.39
It should be noted at least parenthetically that one indulges in somewhat spurious
assertion when one declares that the labor participation rate is very much lower in
developed than in underdeveloped countries among (say) males under 20 years of
age and somewhat lower even among those aged 20-24. For most of those under
24 and not in the labor force are acquiring an education which will make them
a- See THE AGING OF PoPuLATIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 5x-56; Age Structure and Labour Supply, in 3 PAOcEEDINGs OF TH WORLD POPULATION" CONFERENCE
571-96 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1955.XIIJ.8); Factors Affecting the Size of the Economically Active, Popu-
lation, id. at 597-613; GERaTRuxD BANCROFT, THE AMERICAN LABoR FORCE ch. 3 (1958), CLARENCE D.
LONG, THE LA3oR FORCE UNDER CHANGING INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 144-58, appendices A, B (x958);
Durand, Population Structure as a Factor in Manpower and Dependency Problems of Under-Developed
Countries, 3 U.N. PoPu-ATION BLtrnm x-6 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1954.XIII.8); Schiffman, Marital and
Family Characteristics of Workers, 84 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 355-64 (x96x); Stein & Travis, Labor Force
and Employment in z96o, 84 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 344-54 (x961).
3 See, e.g., LONG, Op. cit. supra note 38, at 174-80; BANCROFT, op. cit. supra note 38, at 65-69.
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more productive later; and they cannot be so engaged and at the same time func-
don as full-time members of the labor force. It is relevant from the economic
point of view only that, given the rates and conditions under which capital is
available for investment in education and otherwise, such investment be carried
out as far as is warranted by the investment alternatives present and by the direct
and the indirect net increases in future output imputable to such educational in-
vestment. For such investment not only increases the productivity of individuals
as such but also augments the pool of technical knowledge, strengthens rational
behavioristic tendencies, and generally renders man's milieu more favorable to
production. Countries differ in respect of the patterns of investment in education
suited to their economic conditions; for countries differ in respect of capital scarcity
and discount rates applicable, of income that must be foregone to acquire education,
of the rate of increase in productivity associated with the rate of increase in educa-
tional investment, and so on.4 ° In sum then discussions of the relation of age to
labor-force participation need to take into account income-augmenting effects con-
sequent upon nonparticipation in the labor force.
Of the two remaining determinants of the significance of changes in age com-
position for productivity, by far the most important is the response of the produc-
tive capacity of workers to changes in age. It is true that unemployment varies
somewhat with age, tending to be relatively higher among younger and older
workers; but this variation is essentially a function of social organization rather
than of the influence which age exercises upon a worker's psycho-physical capaci-
ties, his experience, etc. It is this influence, however, which, together with educa-
tion, underlies the association of variation in productivity with variation in age.
Here it will suffice to indicate that productivity generally rises to a peak in the
45-54 age group and then moves down gradually, or even to assume that it moves to
a plateau in the 35-54 age group and then gradually descends. Given the pattern
of the correlation of productivity with age, it is unlikely that changes in the age
composition of the age group 15-64 will materially affect average output per member
of the labor force; for productivity per person tends to be higher among those aged
6o-69 than among those aged 15-24 under modern conditions.5
Changes in a population's age composition could be influenced by several cir-
cumstances which are, but which need not be, associated with such changes. First,
when a society is technologically very dynamic, much of the knowledge acquired
by older persons in their earlier years tends to become obsolete unless they continue
''These matters will be treated in Gary S. Becker's forthcoming study of investment in education,
being done under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
"See Spengler, The Economic Effects of Changes in Age Composition, in JOSEPH J. SPENGLER &
Oris DUDLEY DUNCAN (EDs.), DEMOGnAPHmC ANALYSIS: SELECTED READINGS 497-5X7 (956); I A.
SAUVY, TfdOIUE iNg"RALE DE LA PoPULATnoN chs. 6,8 (1952). Around 185o, about 39-43% of those
in the age group 15-64 in then relatively developed countries, were aged 45-64; by x95o, this per-
centage had risen to 47-54. When fertility is low, the proportion of the labor force aged 45 or more
years will be higher than when fertility is high. This proportion is affected very little, however, by
differences in life expectancy. See ThE AGING OF POPULArIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICA-
*IONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at x5-18, 54-56.
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to refresh their knowledge and replace the old by the new in so far as the latter is
technologically and economically superior. Given a low Gross Reproduction Rate
and the prolongation of life in prospect, a larger than current fraction of "top"
and "choice" decision-making posts could pass into the hands of relatively old
persons who were governed by comparatively obsolete ideas and conceptions, par-
ticularly if selection for these posts were much affected by bias in favor of older
persons, as well as by randomness. Should this gerontocratic result come about, the
economy would be less progressive than it otherwise might. This contingency may
be guarded against through continuous provision for adult refresher training and
education and through making social selection entirely dependent on prospective
as well as on past capacity to perform.4 It is perhaps well to remember, however,
that in a traditional and quite static society in which the father has much to teach
the son, many of the conditions present (e.g., high morbidity rates, high mortality,
superstition, empirically untenable beliefs, etc.) make for the absence instead of
the presence of that buoyancy and that set of conditions (e.g., long time-horizons,
rationality of approach, good health, this-worldliness, etc.) which are so essential to
technical progress43  Second, when fertility is very low and hence the rate of growth
of the labor force is very low, it may be more difficult to preserve an optimum
balance among occupations than when fertility is higher. For then there is rela-
tively more need than in a growing labor force for interoccupational shifts, and the
maintenance of optimum balance depends largely on the skill with which newly-
entering members of the labor force are directed into occupational areas in which
labor-demand functions are shifting to the right. This problem, together with others
associated with low rates of population growth, are readily solved; it is necessary
only to apply the techniques at handV4
Man's ability to offset an unfavorable age composition is much greater today
than it was lOO-i5o years ago. For today fifty to seventy-five per cent of all increase in
output is attributable to increase in physical capital, to improvement in the quality of
the labor force, to technological progress, and (in some measure) to increase in scale-
and other economies. If increase in these productive forces accounts for two-
thirds of an annual increase of three per cent in aggregate output,45 it does not take
"For a fuller account of this problem, see Spengler, Some Effects of Changes in the Age Composition
of the Labor Force, 8 SouRm Ecom J. 157-75 (194). On the aging of elites see also Tus AoIo
oF POPULATIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6o-6i.
For an admirable comparison of traditional society in which death is at the center of life with a
modern society, see Fourasti6, De la vie traditionnelle h la vie tertiaire, 14 POPULATION 417-32 (1959).
A See my papers cited in notes 41 and 42 supra; the papers reprinted in Josnpu J. SPENOLER & Onis
DUDLEY DUNCAN (EDs.), POPULATION THEORY AND POLICY 234-301 (x956); and my The Population
Problem: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, 27 SotHrrEtMN EcON. J. 194 (g6z). On how the rate of entry
into and the rate of departure from the labor force varies with changes in the G.R.R. and life ex-
pectancy, respectively, see THE AGING OF POPULATIONS AND ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, Op,. Cit.
supra note 2, at 56-6o.
"According to Moses Abramovitz, in the United States between the periods 1869-78 and 1944-53,
net national product increased 1,315%, although the civilian labor force increased only 393% and the
input bf civilian man-hours only 29o%. See Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since
1870, 52 OCCASIONAL PAPERS 8 (1956). I have used the term "attributable" above instead of the term
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long to increase income per capita by enough to offset, though not necessarily to
eliminate, an initially sub-optimal age composition. For example, suppose that
output per capita in country L is five to fifteen per cent below that in country H be-
cause age composition is less favorable in L than in H. Under the circumstances stip-
ulated and given that per capita income rises very little in H for a decade, it would
take only 2-7 years for per capita income in L to approximate that in H. Even if
technological conditions were the same in L as in H and per capita income were
five to fifteen per cent lower in L than in H solely because of differences in age com-
position, L could still bring its average income abreast of that in H by recourse to a
combination of compensatory measures (e.g., accelerate rates of capital formation and
technical progress; lengthen work-week; delay retirement; introduce more women
into the labor force).
Recourse to such counterbalancing measures tends to be more difficult when the
source of unfavorable age composition is high fertility than when it is a combina-
tion of very high life expectancy (i.e., a life expectancy in or beyond the upper
7o's) with very low fertility (i., a G.R.R. little above I.o). When fertility is low,
it is much easier to augment investment per capita than when fertility is high
and population growth is absorbing a great deal of the capital being formed. It
is less difficult to lengthen the work-week when this week is relatively short as is
common in low-fertility countries than when it is relatively long as is more com-
mon in high-fertility countries. It is easier to defer retirement when age of
retirement is typically low as in low-fertility countries than when it is relatively
high as in high-fertility countries. It usually is comparatively easier also to increase
the relative number of women enrolled in the labor force when fertility is low,
for then the claims per woman of childbearing and child rearing are lower than in
high-fertility countries.
The burden of what has been said is to the effect that increase in the Struld-
bruggian component of modern populations, or in the relative number of de-
pendent persons (i.e., those aged 0-14 and 6o or 65 and over), will not tend to re-
duce potential productivity per capita appreciably. Nor need prospective changes
in age composition materially affect the overall ratio of dependents to producers,
or the dependency cost incident on the average producer. Up to now, of course,
decline in fertility, together with increase in life expectancy, has not adversely af-
fected this ratio. Furthermore, increase in working life expectancy kept pace with
that of retirement-life expectancy (i.e., separation from the labor force for reasons
other than death) until recently, since the average number of years spent in retire-
ment did not until recently begin to increase much faster than the average number
spent working. Around i9oo in the male population in the United States the ratio
of retirement-life expectancy at age 20 to working-life expectancy at age 2o was
.o69; it had risen to 0.121 by 1947 and to o.x46 by i958. By the year 2000 it could
"imputable," since I am dealing with change over time and am not concerned with imputation as of a
given time.
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easily exceed o.a. In other words, whereas in i9oo an American male did about four-
teen years' work for each year spent in retirement, he may, by the year 200o if present
life-expectancy and retirement trends continue, be doing only about five years of work
for each year he spends in retirement. It is doubtful if, should he spend so large
a portion of his post-i9 lifetime in idleness, he can provide for his needs during
retirement at a rate commensurate with his wants, tastes, etc. Under the circum-
stances, therefore, there might be political pressure for greater support of retired
persons by the state and this could result in both inflationary financing and a de-
crease in the rate of capital formation. It could happen, of course, if such outcome
became likely, that steps would be taken to defer retirement and extend the length
of working life as would be necessary to prevent a decline in per capita income.46
For those in the younger age groups, upon whom the cost would largely fall, would
be motivated to exercise counter-political pressure, with the result that age differ-
ences could become a divisive factor.
Changes in age composition produce changes in the ratio of dependents to pro-
ducers and these in turn exercise some influence on fertility, on length of working.
life, and on the provision made for dependents. (a) Let us suppose that a girl
marries at age 18-2o, lives in this state for at least 2o years, has a first child a year
later, has 6 more at intervals of about 2 years, and may have 2 more at intervals
of about 3 years. If half these children die in the first five years as happens when
life expectancy at birth is in the lower 20'S, only 3-4 children would be living at the
close of the mother's effective childbearing period. This number might be around
5-6, 6-7, and 7-8, respectively, if life expectancy were around 30, 45, or 6D. If,
furthermore, children entered the labor force when ten years of age, the maximum
number of dependent children in a family at any time, given these four life ex-
pectancies, would be around 2, 3-4, 4, and 5, respectively. If, however, children
could not enter the labor force until the sixteenth year, the maximum number of
child-dependents would rise to around 4, 5, 6, and 7. Hence both increase in life
expectancy and deferment of entry into the labor force increase the dependency
burden imposed by children upon parents. (b) That a larger fraction of males
under 20, 55-64, and 65 and over remain enrolled in the labor force in high-fertility
than in low-fertility countries is attributable in part to the comparative lowness in
high-fertility countries of the percentage of the population in the age group 15-59
'In 1900-02, male working-life expectancy at age 2o, and retirement-life expectancy at age 2o,
respectively, were 39.3 and 2.7. The corresponding figures were 42.8 and 5.2 in x947, 43.x and 6.3 in
i958, and 45.x and 8.7 or higher in 2ooo. Life-expectancy and working-life expectancy at birth were
47.9 and 31.1 in i9oo-o2, 64.2 and 42.3 in 1958, and (as estimated in 1955) 73.2 and 45.! in 2000.
See Garfinkle, Changes in Working Life of Men, 1900-2000, 78 MoNTsy LABoR lEV. 297-300 (1955),
reprinted in SPENGLER & DuNcAN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 104-07; Health and Working Life, io
PRoGREss ni -ha.'.rs SEav.cas 1-5 (April ig6x). On length of working life and its relation to life
expectancy, see Wolfbein, The Length of Working Life, 3 PoULAroN Sr $mzs 286-94 (1949); Johansen,
Death Rates, Age Distribution and Average Income in Stationary Populations, ixi id. 64-77 (1957);
Durand, supra note 38, at 9 (comparative tables). Johansen, working with a stationary-population model
concluded that as average lifetime increased the upper limit of productive ages needed to increase in
order to make possible an appreciable increase in average income. See Johansen, supra at 76-77.
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(or 15-64) and the consequence that potential and actual per capita productivity is
relatively low; but it is attributable also to the agricultural and less-urban character
of the economies found in high-fertility countries0 7 (c) Since the needs of de-
pendents vary somewhat with age, changes in the age composition of the de-
pendent population may affect the ratio of needs to dependents, though the general
level of needs per dependent is determined largely by socio-economic circumstances
not immediately connected with age of dependents4 These changes may also
affect the attitude of producers toward dependents in that more satisfaction tends
to be derived from the support of young than from that of old dependents.
IV
CONCLUSION
Several inferences may be drawn in addition to the conclusions presented in
various parts of this essay. (I) Population aging in the sense of increase in the pro-
portion of the population aged 65 and over will continue in most parts of the world,
but particularly in what are now high-fertility countries. (2) It will be the result
primarily, as in the past, of decline in fertility, though it may also be occasioned in
some measure in low-fertility countries by decline in mortality, if, contrary to
expectations, the average duration of life is permitted to move into and even be-
yond the upper 70's. (3) Population aging does not tend to be accompanied by
increase in the ratio of a population's dependency burden to its capacity to support
such burden, even ceteris paribus; for increase in the relative number aged 65 and
over usually is accompanied by decrease in that under 15 and by increase in that
15-64. Only if fertility is very low and life expectancy rises much above present
levels is there a tendency for the ratio of persons of dependent age to persons of
productive age to rise. (4) The movement of per capita income is determined
predominandy by circumstances other than changes in age composition. (5) The
real cost of providing support for persons of dependent age is determined largely by
circumstances unconnected with age structure as such, that is, by the level and dis-
tribution of income, by the pattern of tastes, by the emphasis being put upon eco-
nomic growth, and so on. (6) It is easy to modify a population's age structure,
in that only the gross reproduction rate needs to be modified appreciably. (7)
It is very easy for a low-fertility population to introduce economic measures which
offset increases in the relative number of persons aged less than 15 or more than
64 years, but it is not so easy for a high-fertility population to take countervailing
measures. The latter has little recourse except to reduce its fertility.
'" See, e.g., Durand, supra note 38, at 9-15.
'"For a discussion of the variation of "needs" with age, see ThE AGING OF POPUMAIONS AND ITS
SocIAL AND EcONoMIc ImLCATnONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 61-81.
